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I don't have to go through my list of recent news articles 
about the pesticide controversy to tell you that there is intense 
interest on the part of the state and federal legislatures, the 
news media and some individuals on this issue. There is no 
one in this room that is unaware of the controversy. But do 
you really understand what's going on out there? Or do you, 
like many, sit back and wring your hands wondering why 
someone doesn't "do something!" about the bad rap pes-
ticides get when you pick up your newspaper or turn on your 
television? Who's out there "educating the public" to gain 
their acceptance of pesticides as a necessary part of life?
NO "WHITE KNIGHT" PR PROGRAMS
Overall, I think many people in the agricultural and 
chemical industries want to hire a big PR firm to go out there 
and "educate the public" ~ make them accept the use of 
chemicals in agriculture and stop complaining about it. I've 
been dealing with this controversy from a PR role since 1980, 
and I think I can say with some assurance, that's not going to 
happen. Why? A couple of reasons. First, because there is 
no mechanism in place — organizationally or financially -
within the agricultural and chemical industries on the na-
tional level to conduct a serious program that would have 
significant impact on 235 million Americans. Certainly there 
are numerous lobbyists employed by the 63 national farm and 
ag chemical-related trade associations located in Washing-
ton, D.C., not to mention lobbyists back there who represent 
state and regional groups and companies, but those people 
focus their efforts almost entirely on attempting to persuade 
53 United States Senators and 125 U.S. Congressmen on six 
committees which oversee legislation related to agricultural 
and chemical issues. The National Agricultural Chemicals 
Association, which focuses entirely on ag chem issues, has 
just one person in charge of the entire public affairs efforts of 
the industry. Its public affairs budget has been abysmally 
low, with a good portion of its PR efforts aimed at telling 
farmers and applicators how to avoid accidents, and, to their 
credit, finally waking up to the groundwater contamination 
issue.
But money alone is not the answer in persuading people 
about risks. Ask the U.S. nuclear power industry which 
spends $180 million a year on just its communications 
programs.
More importantly, there is no PR firm or program that has 
the power over the attitudes and beliefs of those 235 million 
Americans to calm the big debate - the big debate being that 
over technology and society, not just pesticides.
THE "EXPERTS" VS. THE "FEARFUL"
Why is it that I am pessimistic about a nationwide effort 
to "educate the public"? Number one, I don't think the 
majority of the ag, chemical or university people even 
understand what the problem is with regard to the public's 
perception of chemicals. And, number two, it is naive to 
believe that a temporary information campaign will alter 
attitudes and beliefs that have, for most people, developed 
over a number of years from many sources of information, 
much of which is not even directly related to the particular 
issue of pesticides.
Let me be more specific about my two points, the first 
being that we don't really understand the problem.
In general, "industry people," along with some academ-
ics and regulators, explain the controversy as a communica-
tions and education problem due to lack of knowledge about 
technology and irrational fear on the part of the public and 
workers. They compare the risks of using chemicals with the 
much greater risk of driving cars, ignoring the fact that the 
public feels "in control" when they drive, they feel it is a 
voluntary activity, and they believe they derive some per-
sonal benefit from using a car.
Chemical users stand up in front of groups and declare, 
"I've used pesticides for 25 years and I have five healthy 
children and I've never missed a day of work," as if to say "If 
I'm safe, so are you." The problem with that argument is that 
it is scientifically invalid, and, most important, people just 
don't believe it. (In a June 1987 public opinion survey 
conducted for the California Alliance for Food and Fiber, 64 
percent of the 500 respondents rejected that as a valid point.)
5
Nevertheless, what "industry and academics" are really 
saying is that people don't realize how low most chemical 
risks faced by the public are, and if they did, the people should 
be willing to tolerate these low-level risks in exchange for 
certain benefits. The expressed strategy: "educate the public 
and they will realize how minimal the risks are."
Those opposed to certain technologies describe the risk 
controversy in very different terms — that of business putting 
profits before people, a governmental system that fails to 
protect the people, and they refer to themselves as helpless 
victims who are "guinea pigs" being subjected to a "time 
bomb" of a dismal nature. They criticize industry and 
academics for making the issues unnecessarily and overly 
complex and too big to deal with, and they charge industry 
with withholding information. They believe, "It's the pollut-
ers who should pay for mistakes, not the consumers nor the 
government."
The strategy for those philosophically opposed to chemi-
cal use: Instill doubt in the minds of the average citizen or 
legislator about the safety of using chemicals (or nuclear 
power, biotechnology or irradiation, for that matter). Then, 
convince the legislators and regulators - and the public - that 
if risks must be borne by the public and/or workers, they 
should be minimized to the fullest extent possible - not 
necessary, but possible - regardless of cost. This is the basis 
for California's Proposition 65 - The Safe Drinking Water 
and Toxic Enforcement Act - the first part of which went into 
effect February 27, 1988. Support is generated at the 
grassroots level by convincing people that they, the people, 
take the risks and it is the faceless, anonymous corporations 
that reap the benefits. People have an innate sense of avoiding 
risks unless they see some personal benefit. And they don't 
see a personal benefit to the use of chemicals in agriculture, 
and many of them don' t see the connection with public health 
protection. This fact, too, was confirmed in our statewide 
survey. We learned that while people may believe that the 
major reasons for pesticide use are increased yields and the 
need to "kill bugs," they do not take that next step and see any 
personal benefits - namely lower food costs and greater 
availability. Only two percent cited a primary use of pesti-
cides as controlling diseases and germs.
THE ESSENCE OF THE CONTROVERSY: CONFLICT-
ING SOCIAL VALUES
In short, the real arguments between environmentalists 
and industry are not so much about facts or probabilities of 
risk as they are objections to the social/political/economic 
systems which generate the risks and with which the average 
person feels few ties. It is a reflection of different attitudes 
toward power, control, choice, infringement upon liberties 
and industrial democracy. Thus, attitudes about technical 
risks tend to be imbedded in conscious and unconscious 
feelings about the source of the risk, along with the issue of 
equity - who gets the benefits and who takes the risks - and 
the issue of liability -- whose fault is contamination and who 
should pay to clean it up?
I've had discussions with a representative of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council in San Francisco with whom I 
occasionally appear opposite in debates. Since she had been 
involved in last year's negotiations between the environ-
mental and the ag and chemical groups over the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), I asked 
her whether the disagreements centered mainly on factual or 
ideological differences. The long arguments were over 
ideology; the short ones were about information. Her 
example was the liability issue for groundwater. The farmers 
wanted to be exempted from liability if groundwater were to 
become polluted from ag practices. The manufacturers 
wanted out, saying "If applied according to label directions 
...," and the NRDC felt that in an ideal world the manufac -
turers should be held liable as an incentive for safer products, 
but that it was difficult to determine exactly how and why the 
contamination occurred and whose fault it was. Each interest 
group brought into play their values of how society should 
operate and where responsibility lies when things don't go 
according to plan.
What all of this means in terms of the chemical contro-
versy is that individuals or groups committed to different 
social/political ideologies (for instance, technical progress 
and economic competition versus agrarian Utopia and preser-
vation of a pristine environment) are headed for a clash.
THE FALLACY OF "EDUCATING THE PUBLIC"
I hinted earlier my feelings about the ineffectiveness of 
a temporary information or PR campaign. This is based on 
the established communications principle that peoples' val-
ues do not necessarily change with more information -
particularly when the information is conflicting or when it 
contradicts what they already perceive to be true. As they say 
in communications research, people tend to hear what they 
believe, not the other way around. This is why communica-
tions efforts by "business advocates" and even scientists, 
particularly industry scientists, and even government regula-
tors, are sometimes greeted with skepticism, if not the charge 
that "you're lying." The information the public hears from 
these sources is not consistent with their internal beliefs about 
the motivations, credibility and responsibility of industry and 
regulators.
In addition, there is some evidence that knowing just a 
little bit about something can make you more skeptical of the 
issue or technology than complete ignorance. Therefore, it 
is naive to believe that the solution to the chemical risk 
controversy in this country is simply to "educate the public." 
Again, the bottom line is that this controversy is as much over 
ideology as it is over information. And ideology is a difficult 
thing to alter with a public relations program. For instance, 
if a person is firmly convinced that industry's greed, reflec-
ted in its use of use of chemicals which are unquestionably 
"toxic," is responsible for a nationwide "cancer epidemic," 
there's not much you can alter that by telling him that coyotes 
and rats really need to be killed or controlled.
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A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF INVOLVEMENT AND 
IMPACT
Well, I've just given you my impressions of the under-
lying themes of the pesticide controversy along with my 
reasons for believing that no white knight PR program is 
going to calm the stormy seas of the pesticide controversy on 
the national level. It even sounds like I've talked myself out 
of a job as being the spokesperson for California agriculture 
on the issue of pesticides and being so presumptuous as to say 
I conduct a PR program on the issue. Should we all just pack 
it up and concede defeat in the battle over public opinion? 
Obviously, I did not set myself up to answer yes and offer my 
resignation at this meeting.
There really is no choice but for each group involved in 
this controversy to figure out its best case and be ready to put 
it forward in a way that addresses the concerns of the public, 
not just that particular group. Next, those groups need to 
realistically assess what impact they can and can't have.
Don't think that any one program is going to reach 235 
million Americans or even California's 26 million residents. 
Most of those people don't have the time or the interest to 
really study the issues as you whose careers depend on it do.
In my experience, most of the farmers, pest control 
advisors, and chemical company people spend an inordinate 
amount of time worrying about the perceptions of people in 
the cities and an inadequate amount of time worrying about 
what people in their own backyard think. Why do I say this? 
Because, realistically, most of you will not have an impact on 
the opinion leaders in our big cities, but you can and will 
affect the perceptions of those you live and work with. And 
if you're having problems in your own backyard, that's what 
may eventually make it to the attention of a wider audience.
So, the first part of my speech tries to make the point that 
it is not possible for a national PR program to get people to 
accept the notion that a little bit of poison is okay. The second 
part of my speech is to emphasize the importance of realizing 
that public relations and education begins in one's own 
backyard, not in a chat with Mike Wallace on "60 Minutes," 
and it is. something each of you can affect.
THE SILENT SCIENTISTS -- THE NEED FOR "TRANS-
LATORS"
Why is it that the most credible source of information on 
the topic of chemicals, university scientists, are reluctant to 
get involved in the controversy? Let me suggest a few 
reasons:
1) It's not their job.  University people talk to other
university people (called peers) and Extension people talk to
farmers and pest control advisors. Few people in the univer-
sity system, with the exception of a few I could count on one
hand, see it as benefiting their careers to direct information
at the interested public or the media. And why should they
if they don't get "brownie points" for it? I, too, would spend
my time doing research to be published under those circum
stances.
2) Even if scientists did want to do something to foster
a better understanding of the realities of pest management,
few scientists really know enough about how to go about it, 
who they should be talking to, or what makes a persuasive 
argument. And, in my opinion, the scientists aren't getting 
very creative help from their communications people on an 
issue that everyone in the ag, the chemical, and the academic 
worlds agrees is a major public perception problem. It's not 
enough to get articles about progress in farming technology 
published in trade publications; why not aim for material the 
public and/or opinion leaders read - such as People magazine 
and Reader's Digest.
3) Scientists often feel harassed, misquoted and mis-
understood. They are and they will be. That's life. Journal-
ists, politicians and environmentalists feel they're underpaid,
overworked and undervalued.  They are and they will be.
That's life. But the journalists, politicians and environment-
talists are going to continue pursuing this chemical contro-
versy; and if legitimate scientists don't take the interest in
speaking up for the realities of producing food, there are other
pseudo-scientists who will.
4) And lastly, some of the scientists, particularly those
who are more experienced in these issues than I, wonder
whether it really makes a difference to get involved. Some
times I ask my self that, too. And I can't really answer. I have
no statistics like the lobbyists do - x number of bills passed
and y number of bills killed. I can deal with that ambiguity
and uncertainty, but I accept that many people would find that
too intangible and frustrating.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
1) If the Land Grant universities are going to direct
much of their resources toward research on chemical pest
control, it seems reasonable that they might want to be more
public in supporting and defending their findings. And, if the
research unveils damaging information, that too should be
known.
2) Undertake some economic analyses of pesticide
use. I've scoured the literature to find out such information
and the best that I can come up with is information gathered
by Dr. David Pimintel of Cornell in the mid-1970s.   The
public, and I, would like to know what differences in yields
and public health protection pesticides make? Why do we
really have to kill fuzzy little animals?
3) Encourage Cooperative Extension to explore possi-
bilities for bringing different factions together in communi-
ties where pesticides and vertebrate pest control seem to be
an issue. Usually, community people want to be listened to
and they want the farming/chemical industries to make some
compromises.   Before the issue starts drawing statewide
attention, perhaps the University could act to bring the groups
together and open up lines of communication.
4) Produce, encourage and reward "translators" —
those scientists and non-scientists who can take complex
scientific information and make it meaningful to the public.
We need committed, sensitive and intelligent people with the
support of their professions, their institutions, and their
companies to put together the best case for the role of
chemicals in controlling pests, acknowledging its weak-
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nesses and shortcomings, and then put themselves on the line 
by taking that message to the media, to opinion leaders, to 
regulators and to legislators. The purpose is not to persuade 
people to like pesticides, but to persuade them to consider
many aspects of the issue before they make their decisions. 
That's when public perception of chemical risks, and ulti-
mately public policy, will begin to swing back to the center.
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